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The rule used by the United States Figure Skating Association and the International Skating Union,
hereafter the ISU Rule, to aggregate individual rankings of the skaters by the judges into a final
ranking, is an interesting example of a social welfare function. This rule is examined thoroughly
in this paper from the perspective of the modern theory of social choice.
The ISU Rule is based on four different criteria, the first being median ranks of the skaters.
Although the median rank criterion is a majority principle, it is completely at odd with another
majority principle introduced in this paper and called the Extended Condorcet Criterion. It may be
translated as follows: If a competitor is ranked consistently ahead of another competitor by an
absolute majority of judges, he should be ahead in the final ranking. Consistency here refers to the
absence of a cycle in the majority relation involving these two skaters. There are actually many
cycles in the data of four Olympic Games that were examined. The Kemeny rule may be used to
break these cycles. This is not only consistent with the Extended Condorcet Criterion but the latter
also proves useful in finding Kemeny orders over large sets of alternatives, by allowing
decomposition of these orders.
The ISU, the Kemeny, the Borda rankings and the ranking according to the raw marks are then
compared on 24 olympic competitions. The four rankings disagree in many instances. Finally it is
shown that the ISU Rule may be very sensitive to small errors on the part of the judges and that
it does not escape the numerous theorems on manipulation. Some considerations are also offered
as to whether the ISU Rule is more or less prone to manipulation than others.
Résumé
La règle utilisée par la United States Figure Skating Association et l’International Skating Union,
ci-après la règle de l’ISU, pour agréger les classements des patineurs par chacun des juges en un
classement final, est un exemple intéressant de fonction de bien-être social. Cette règle est
examinée en détail dans cet article du point de vue de la théorie moderne des choix sociaux.
Cette règle repose sur quatre critères, le premier étant le rang médian des patineurs. Bien que ce
critère soit en fait un principe majoritaire, il va à l’encontre d’un autre principe majoritaire introduit
ici et appelé le Critère de Condorcet généralisé. Il peut être traduit ainsi: Si un compétiteur est
classé avant un autre de manière cohérente par une majorité de juges, il devrait l’être dans le
classement final. La cohérence réfère à l’absence de cycle dans la relation majoritaire impliquant
ces deux compétiteurs. De fait, plusieurs cycles ont été rencontrés dans les données de quatre Jeux
olympiques qui ont été examinées. La règle de Kemeny peut être utilisée pour briser ces cycles.
Non seulement cette règle est-elle cohérente avec le Critère de Condorcet généralisé mais ce
dernier s’avère utile dans la recherche d’ordres de Kemeny sur un grand nombre d’alternatives, en
permettant la décomposition de ces ordres.
Les classements des patineurs selon les règles de l’ISU, de Kemeny, de Borda et selon les notes
brutes sont ensuite comparés pour 24 compétitions olympiques. Les quatre classements sont
souvent différents. Finalement, il est démontré que la règle de l’ISU peut être très sensible à de
petites erreurs de la part des juges et qu’elle n’échappe pas aux nombreux théorèmes
d’impossibilité sur la manipulation. Quelques remarques sont aussi offertes sur la plus ou moins
grande susceptibilité de cette règle à la manipulation par rapport à d’autres règles.1. Introduction
An extensive literature has been devoted to the design of social welfare functions, i.e. rules for
aggregating individual preferences or rankings on a set of alternatives into a collective preference or a final
ranking. Yet, there are not very many instances in real life where the preoccupation is to arrive at a
collective preference, as opposed to merely choosing an alternative or a subset of alternatives. A notable
exception is professional sport, where a wide variety of methods are used to aggregate individual rankings
into a final ranking. These methods are especially prominent in judged sports such as diving, synchronized
swimming, gymnastics, and figure skating, but we also find examples of their use in some professional
sports where ranking could be made from objective data. See for instances Jech (1983), Benoit (1992),
and Levin and Nalebuff (1995).
Among judged sports, figure skating has probably become the most popular. Almost everybody
knows that skaters are ranked from the scores that they receive from a panel of judges. However, very few
people know exactly how the aggregation procedure works. Given the complexity of this procedure, this
is quite understandable. Bassett and Persky (1994), hereafter BP, analyze the rule used by the United
States Figure Skating Association (1992) and the International Skating Union (1994), hereafter the ISU
Rule, to come up with a final ranking of the skaters. They stress the fact that figure skating uses median
ranks for determining placement. This is indeed what paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 of Rule 371 of the ISU,
reproduced in the Appendix, amount to.
BP show that this system responds positively to increased marks by each judge and respects the
view of a majority of judges when this majority agrees on a skater’s rank. They also demonstrate that the
Median Rank Principle is the only one to possess these two properties. Moreover, they claim that this
principle provides strong safeguards against manipulation by a minority of judges. Finally, in a Monte
Carlo study, they find that the ISU Rule outperforms the simple aggregation of raw marks in picking the
true winner, when judges’ marks are subject to errors and significantly skewed toward an upper limit.
BP’s analysis is mostly confined to the Median Rank Principle. Yet, there are three other
principles that are also used by the ISU Rule to break ties left by the Median Rank Principle. One of them
is the mean rank, which is equivalent to the Borda (1784) principle or Borda Count. The latter has
3received much attention in the literature. The ISU also uses a weighted sum of the ranks to aggregate the
rankings in the different programs of a competition into a final ranking. This is similar to using the Borda
rule. This paper examines more thoroughly all aspects of the ISU Rule from the perspective of the modern
theory of social choice. It also compares four different ranking rules on the data of 24 olympic
competitions: men, women, and couple, short and free programs, for 1976, 1988, 1992 and 1994.
Since the ISU Rule combines many ranking principles, which are characterized by different
properties, it is not surprising that, as a whole, it violates many properties that are often judged desirable
for social welfare functions. This paper shows which properties the ISU Rule satisfies and which it
violates. In particular, like most social welfare functions encountered in the literature, the ISU Rule does
not satisfy the monotonicity condition usually found in the theory of social choice. This is why BP use
a weaker monotonicity condition, namely the positive response of the rule to increased marks by each
judge, to characterize the Median Rank Principle.
The median rank of a skater being the best rank that he or she obtains from a majority of judges,
clearly the Median Rank Principle translates a majority principle. As compelling as this majority principle
may seem, it is completely at odds with another prominent majority principle advocated by Condorcet
(1785), who was a colleague of Borda at the French Académie des sciences. This principle prescribes that
if a competitor is ranked ahead of another competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he should be
ahead in the final ranking. Unfortunately, this principle may fail to give a consistent ranking because of
a cycle in the majority relation, a possibility that Condorcet was well aware of. For example, A may be
judged better than B by a strict majority of judges, who may be judged better than C, who may be judged
better than D, and D may be judged better than A. This probably explains why the Condorcet Criterion
that we find nowadays in the literature simply says that if a competitor is ranked ahead of all other
competitors by an absolute majority of judges, he should be first in the final ranking. Again such a
competitor may fail to exist because of a cycle. When it exists, it is called the Condorcet winner.
Despite the possibility of cycles, there is still something to be drawn for other ranks from
Condorcet’s prescription. A more general criterion, called the Extended Condorcet Criterion, is proposed
in this paper. Loosely speaking, it says that if a competitor is ranked consistently ahead of another
4competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he or she should be ahead in the final ranking. Consistency
here refers to the absence of cycle involving these two skaters.
What is the probability of encountering cycles? We find many computations and estimations of
the fractions of profiles of votes leading to cycles. Computer simulations by Campbell and Tullock (1965)
give an estimate of .305 for 7 voters and 7 alternatives. This fraction increases with the number of voters.
It is .342 for 9 voters. It also increases with the number of alternatives, going to .464 with 9 voters and
11 alternatives. However, one must be cautious not to interpret these fractions as probabilities applicable
to real life situations since the different profiles might not be equiprobable. When the number of the voters
becomes large, there can be strong correlations in their rankings, thus reducing the probability of cycles.
For more on this topic, see Fishburn (1973) and Kelly (1986).
In figure skating, if the judges abide by the ISU Rules and try to be as objective as possible, we
should expect a strong correlation between their rankings of the skaters and thus no or few cycles. Thus
it was somewhat surprising to find 15 cycles in the data of the 24 olympic competitions. Note that many
of these cycles occurred for the weak majority relation instead of the strict one, i.e. they involved some
ties between skaters. Ties could not be neglected despite the complication that they usually bring. Indeed,
two skaters may tie even if the number of judges is odd because a judge may give the same rank to more
than one skater. Ties may create cycles in the weak majority relation and increase the length of existing
ones.
The cycles that have been found in the olympic games involved as many as nine skaters. These
were often middle ranked skaters, as if the disagreements between the judges occur mainly for competitors
who are not medal contenders. However, in one case these were famous skaters. In another case, one of
the skaters in the cycle actually obtained the third place in the ISU ranking. These cycles never prevented
the occurrence of a Condorcet winner, except in one instance where two skaters tied for this title.
In the presence of cycles, the Extended Condorcet Criterion gives only a partial ranking of the
competitors. A partial ranking may be completed in different ways but there is one method to accomplish
this task that is perfectly in line with Condorcet’s quest. The best way to introduce this method is to turn
to an interesting question raised by BP.
5Are judging systems such as the one that prevails in figure skating intended to reconcile the
conflicting views of the judges or are they intended to furnish a final ranking that is most likely to be the
true ranking of the competitors, based on their relative merits? Obviously, the answer depends on whether
the rankings of the judges represent their preferences or an evaluation of the relative merits of the
competitors according to given criteria. The regulations of the ISU are very clear in this respect. The
judges are supposed to give an objective evaluation of the relative merits of the competitors in terms of
scores. The different scores attributed to the different elements of the competition are then aggregated and
the ranking of each judge is determined from these aggregated scores.
Of course, these instructions do not preclude cheating by judges who may hope that their marks
will result in their most preferred ranking. For instance, Campbell and Galbraith (1996) find strong
evidence of the presence of a small national bias in the results of the 24 olympic competitions analyzed
in this paper. Yet, if we take the rankings of the different judges as independent evaluations of the true
ranking of the competitors according to the established rules, we are led to the question: which final
ranking is most likely to be the true ranking of the competitors? This is precisely the question addressed
by Condorcet (1785), whose objective was to justify the usual majority principle.
If the pairwise ranking of the competitors under the majority rule does not involve any cycle, then
Condorcet showed that it yields a complete ranking that has maximum likelihood of being the true
ranking, under the assumption that every judge chooses the best of two competitors with a probability
larger than one half and that this judgment is independent between pairs and judges. This makes the
Condorcet majority principle more compelling than the ISU principle.
Condorcet gave indications on how to break cycles that might occur. However, his prescription
is not completely clear. Young (1988) shows that a correct application of Condorcet’s maximum likelihood
approach leads to a ranking that has the maximum pairwise support from the voters (judges). Such a
ranking is often called a Kemeny ranking because it involves the minimum number of pairwise inversions
with the individual rankings. Kemeny (1959) proposes this number as a distance between an order and
a profile of individual rankings. Such a ranking is also a median ranking for those composing a profile.
In this sense, it represents a best compromise between the possibly conflicting views of the judges. This
paper examines the Kemeny-Young approach and advocates this method in the context of figure skating.
6Not only does a Kemeny order satisfy the Extended Condorcet Criterion but the latter turns out to be of
great help in constructing Kemeny orders. The precise method is described in Truchon (1998).
Would the use of a different rule by the ISU, such as the Kemeny or the Borda rule, give
significantly different rankings of the skaters in real competitions? Levin and Nalebuff (1995), using data
from 30 British Union elections, find that many different electoral systems would not have given different
top choices. The systems differed in the ranking of the lower candidates. They suggest that, when voters’
preferences are sufficiently similar, a variety of voting systems lead to similar choices, and these choices
have desirable properties. The difficulties in aggregating preferences would arise when there is a lack of
consensus. In this case, the choice of an electoral system can make the greatest difference.
In the case of skating, many disagreements have been found between the ISU, the Borda, the
Kemeny rankings and the ranking according to raw marks for the 24 olympic competitions. The
differences between the ISU and the Kemeny rankings include the conflicts between the Extended
Condorcet Criterion and the Median Rank Principle. A summary of these comparisons appears in Table
4. The measure of the disagreement between two rankings is the number of pairs of competitors for which
the relative ranks are inverted. For example, there are two inversions between the orders cab and abc
namely one for the pair {a, c} and another one for the pair {b, c}. If two competitors obtain the same rank
in one ranking and different ranks in another ranking, this is counted as half a difference.
Many of the differences occurred for middle places but disagreements for these places may be
important since participation in future competitions may depend on being ranked in the first ten places.
In one case, the ISU Rule gave a fourth place while the Kemeny rule gave a third place. In two instances,
the Kemeny rule gave a tie for the first rank instead of ranks 1 and 2. In one instance, it gave a tie for
the second place instead of ranks 2 and 3. Finally, in four instances, it gave a tie for the third place instead
of ranks 3 and 4. Thus the choice of a rule is not merely a theoretical question. It can have a real impact
on the results.
The last issue treated in this paper is manipulation, or the misrepresentation of one’s true ranking
by a judge in order to change the final ranking for one that he or she prefers. For example, a judge may
prefer rankings that favour a particular competitor. There is a famous impossibility theorem in this context,
due to Gibbard (1973) and Satthertwaite (1975), which says that all social choice functions, i.e. functions
that select a winner, are manipulable. More generally, a judge may prefer a ranking to another, not just
7because of the winner, but because of the whole ranking. Bossert and Storcken (1992) extend the Gibbard-
Satthertwaite theorem to this context, i.e. to social welfare functions or ranking rules.
The ISU Rule does not escape these theorems. This paper shows, by means of examples, how the
different principles on which rests the ISU Rule, including the Median Rank Principle, are prone to
manipulation. It also shows that the ISU Rule may be very sensitive to small errors on the part of the
judges. This is troublesome if we are after the best evaluation of a true ranking.
Some ranking rules may be more prone to manipulation than others. The question is then whether
or not the ISU Rule does well in this respect. Some considerations on this matter are offered, drawing on
recent work by Saari (1990). However, the present state of research does not permit a clear-cut answer
on this subject.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation including the formal
description of the ISU Rule. Section 3 presents BP’s characterization of the Median Rank Principle, shows
that the last steps of the ISU Rule consist in applying the Borda criterion and examines the whole ISU
Rule from the perspective of properties that are often encountered in the theory of social choice. It shows
which ones are satisfied by the ISU Rule and which ones are violated. Section 4 defines the Extended
Condorcet Criterion and shows that this criterion as well as the ordinary Condorcet Criterion are at odds
with the ISU Rule. Section 5 illustrates the possible conflicts between the Condorcet principle, the Borda
criterion and the ISU Rule. The quest for a true ranking, which culminates in the Kemeny rule, is the
object of Sections 6 and 7. The comparison of four different rules on olympic data is done in Section 8.
Manipulability is taken up is Section 9. A summary of the paper and concluding remarks on the choice
of a ranking rule are offered in Section 10.
2. Notation
Let X be the set of competitors, skaters or alternatives, with cardinality X = m, and N be the
set of judges or voters, with N = n, an odd number. The terms competitor, skater and alternative will
be used interchangeably, depending on the context. The first two are more appropriate to our context while
the term alternative is more usual in the theory of social choice. This term will often be used when
referring to this theory. The same kind of remark applies to the terms judge and voter.
8From the scores given to the competitors by judge j, we obtain a weak order or ranking r
j of the
competitors in X. The element r
j
s of this vector is the rank of skater s. A ranking with no tie for a rank
is an order on X. An order can be represented alternatively as a sequence s1s2..., where s1 and s2 are
respectively the competitors with ranks 1 and 2, etc.
Let Â be the set of all possible rank vectors r.Aprofile of rankings is an m × n matrix R =
(r
1, ..., r
n) ÎÂ
n.Aranking rule is a mapping FR : Â
n ®Â . FR(R) is the final ranking resulting from
profile R. In the language of the theory of social choice, FR is a social welfare function.
Next, let us define:
Nis(R)={ j Î N : r
j
s £ i}, nis(R)= Nis(R), ¯ nis(R)= { j Î N : r
j
s =i },
rs(R) = min i Î {1, ..., m} such that nis(R)>n/2.
For the sake of simplicity, let:
Nrs(R)=Nrs s(R) and nrs(R)=nrs s(R).
Next, let:
Brs(R)=åj Î Nrsr
j
s, Bs(R)=åj Î Nr
j
s,
nst(R)= { j Î N : r
j
s <r
j
t}.
Nis(R) is the set of judges who rank skater s at rank i or better, nis(R) their number and ¯ nis(R) the
number of those placing skater s exactly at rank i. rs(R) is the median rank of skater s, Brs(R) is the sum
of the ranks that s obtains from the judges who gave him or her the median rank or better, Bs(R) is the
sum of the ranks that s obtains from all judges, and nst(R) is the number of judges who rank skater s ahead
of skater t. Note that Bs(R)/n is the mean rank of s.
Finally, we define the complete binary relation M on X by sMt Ûn st ³n ts. We write M for the
asymmetric component of M, i.e. the relation defined by sMt Ûn st > nts and T for the symmetric
component of M, i.e. the relation defined by sTt Ûn st = nts. They are respectively the majority relation,
the strict majority relation and the ex aequo relation on X. We can read sMt as s defeats t and sTt as s
ties with t. A cycle of M is a subset {x1, ..., xk} Ì X such that xiMxi+1, i=1, ..., k − 1, and xkMx1. One
defines similarly cycles of M and T. Equivalently, a cycle of T is a subset S Ì X such that sTt " s,t Î S.
Cycles of M and T are obviously cycles of M.
9Rule 371 of the ISU Regulations, which prescribes how the final ranks of the competitors are
determined, is reproduced in the Appendix. The ISU ranking rule, as we shall call it, can be formally
defined as follows. Its definition involves five steps incorporating four principles or criteria. When a
principle has been applied, the next one is used only if there remain ties between some competitors.
The ISU Rule: " R ÎÂ
n, " s, t Î X,
a) rs(R)<rt(R) Þ FRs(R)<FRt(R)
b) rs(R)=rt(R) and nrs(R)>nrt(R) Þ FRs(R)<FRt(R)
c) rs(R)=rt(R), nrs(R)=nrt(R) and Brs(R)<Brt(R) Þ FRs(R)<FRt(R)
d) rs(R)=rt(R), nrs(R)=nrt(R), Brs(R)=Brt(R) and Bs(R)<Bt(R) Þ FRs(R)<FRt(R)
e) rs(R)=rt(R), nrs(R)=nrt(R), Brs(R)=Brt(R) and Bs(R)=Bt(R) Þ FRs(R)=FRt(R)
In plain words, a) skaters are first ranked according to their median ranks rs(R). b) If two skaters,
say s and t, tie for a rank, one tries to break the tie according to the respective numbers of judges nrs(R)
and nrt(R) who gave them their respective median rank or a better rank. c) If criterion b) is not sufficient
to break all ties, one then takes into consideration the sum of the ranks obtained from the judges who gave
the median rank or a better rank to these competitors. d) If there still remains some ties after criterion c)
has been applied, one uses the sum of the ranks obtained from all judges or equivalently the mean rank
as a breaking criterion. e) Finally, if all ties are not resolved after principles a) − d) have been applied,
competitors who tie for a rank obtain the same rank.
As pointed out by BP, principle a), which they call the Median Rank Principle (MRP), translates
paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 of rule 371. Criteria b), c), and d) translate respectively paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of
rule 371. Moreover, they take into account paragraphs 7, 8, and 9. Finally, criterion e) translates the first
part of paragraph 10. The second part, which says that if two competitors tie for the first place, the next
place to be awarded is third place (not second) and so on, shall not be formalized.
The example of Table 1, reproduced from the ISU Regulations book, illustrates the application
of the ISU Rule. The final rank, as given by this rule appears under the heading ISU. Note that A is
ranked ahead of B by using principle a) alone. There is a tie between I and J after application of principle
a). It is resolved in favour of I by reverting to principle b). One must go as far as to principle c) to rank
10D ahead of E and to principle d) to rank B ahead of C. However, there remains a tie between K and L
even after applying the first four principles.
3. Properties of the ISU Rule
We start with an interesting characterization of principle a) of the ISU Rule due to Bassett and
Persky (1994). We then show that principles d) and e) consist in applying the Borda criterion to the
skaters that remain tied after steps a) − c). Principle c) is a sort of restricted Borda criterion. Finally, we
examine the whole ISU procedure from the perspective of properties often found in the theory of social
choice.
BP show that (MRP) or step a) of the ISU Rule is the only criterion to satisfy simultaneously a
certain majority principle and a weak monotonicity condition, which they also misname incentive
compatibility. The logical propositions defining these two conditions, as the ones to follow later in this
section, must hold for all profiles R, ˜ R ÎÂ
n and all pairs s, t Î X such that s ¹ t.
Rank Majority Principle (RMP)
[¯ nis(R)>n/2, ¯ nkt(R)>n/2, and i<k ] Þ FRs(R)<FRt(R)
Bassett and Persky Monotonicity (BPM)
[˜ r
j
s £ r
j
s and ˜ r
j
t ³ r
j
t, " j Î N] Þ
[FRs(R)<FRt(R) Þ FRs( ˜ R)<FRt( ˜ R) and FRs(R)=FRt(R) Þ FRs( ˜ R) £ FRt( ˜ R)]
(RMP) says that if two skaters obtain a majority for two different ranks, this ought to be reflected in their
relative final ranking. (BPM) says that if all judges were to improve or maintain the ranking of skater s
while diminishing or maintaining the ranking of skater t, then the final ranking of skater s should remain
at least as good as the one of skater t if it was so before the change.
Theorem 1 (Bassett and Persky): (MRP) Û [(BPM) and (RMP)].
11Proof. Suppose (MRP) holds. For any s, t Î X, if there exist ranks i and k such that i<k , ¯ nis(R)>n/2
and ¯ nkt(R)>n/2, then rs(R)=i < k = rt(R), which implies FRs(R)<FRt(R) by (MRP). Thus (RMP)
holds. That (BPM) holds is immediate from the definitions.
Conversely, suppose (BPM) and (RMP) hold but that (MRP) fails, i.e. $ R ÎÂ
n, s, t Î X such that s ¹
t, and positive integers i, k such that i=rs(R)<rt(R)=k but FRs(R) ³ FRt(R). Then consider another
profile ˜ R ÎÂ
n such that, " j Î N, r
j
s £ i Þ ˜ r
j
s =i , r
j
s >iÞ ˜ r
j
s =r
j
s, r
j
t ³ k Þ ˜ r
j
t =k , and r
j
t <kÞ ˜ r
j
t =
r
j
t. This gives ¯ nis( ˜ R)= nrs( ˜ R)>n/2 and ¯ nkt( ˜ R)= nrt( ˜ R)>n/2. Thus, by (RMP), we must have
FRs( ˜ R)<FRt( ˜ R). By (BPM), we should also have FRs(R)<FRt(R), a contradiction.
Remark 2: (RMP) alone does not imply (MRP). Indeed, consider a ranking rule defined in the following
way. First, rank all competitors according to the Bs(R). Next, if (RMP) is violated for two competitors s
and t, move the one with the smallest (better) rank according to a majority of judges in front of the other
and adjust the rank of those who were between s and t accordingly. Applying this rule to the data of
Example 2 in Table 2 would give the ranking headed BC to start with. Applying (RMP) would then
change this ranking for the ISU final ranking. Now, if judge 2 were to interchange her ranking of B and
E, then B would loose the majority for rank 2 and the final ranking would thus be changed back from the
ISU to the BC ranking, in violation of (MRP). This simple interchange also shows that this rule violates
(BPM). Given Theorem 1, this was to be expected.
The ranking of the skaters according to the Bs(R), headed BC in the examples, is the Borda
ranking. Indeed, the Borda ranking relies on the Borda scores or counts defined as follows. The last
competitor in a judge’s ranking receives a score of zero, the second lowest a score of 1, the third a score
of 2 and so on. Summing these scores over all judges yields the Borda score of each competitor. These
score are then used to rank the competitors.
In our notation, the score that skater s obtains from judge j in a profile R is given by m−r
j
s. The
Borda score of skater s is thus given by mn− Bs(R). The Borda criterion (BC) is thus equivalently defined
by:
" s, t Î X, Bs(R) £ Bt(R) Û FRs(R) £ FRt(R)
12In short, the Borda criterion consists in ranking competitors according to their mean ranks. (BC) is also
equivalent to:
" s, t Î X, [Bs(R)<Bt(R) Û FRs(R)<FRt(R)] and [Bs(R)=Bt(R) Û FRs(R)=FRt(R)]
The two terms within brackets are the two principles used respectively in steps d) and e) of the ISU Rule.
Principle c) is a variant of the Borda criterion. It compares the Brs(R), which can be seen as the
Borda scores computed from the restricted set of judges who give competitor s his or her value rs(R).
However, these sets are not necessarily the same from one skater to the other.
In the theory of social choice, other kinds of properties are often imposed on ranking rules or
deemed desirable. The most famous are probably the four to follow. We analyze the ISU Rule from their
perspective. The first one is a monotonicity condition that is stronger than (BPM).
Monotonicity (M)
[r
j
s < r
j
t Þ ˜ r
j
s < ˜ r
j
t and r
j
s = r
j
t Þ ˜ r
j
s £ ˜ r
j
t, " j Î N] Þ
[FRs(R)<FRt(R) Þ FRs( ˜ R)<FRt( ˜ R) and FRs(R)=FRt(R) Þ FRs( ˜ R) £ FRt( ˜ R)]
Binary Independence (BI)
[r
j
s £ r
j
t Û ˜ r
j
s £ ˜ r
j
t and r
j
s ³ r
j
t Û ˜ r
j
s ³ ˜ r
j
t, " j Î N] Û [FRs(R) £ FRt(R) Û FRs( ˜ R) £ FRt( ˜ R)]
Weak Pareto (WP)
r
j
s < r
j
t, " j Î N Þ FRs(R)<FRt(R)
Non-Dictatorship (ND)
There exists no j Î N such that FR(R)=r
j, " R ÎÂ
n
(M) has the same conclusion as (BPM) but a weaker premise. It is thus stronger. (M) says that
if all judges were to maintain or improve the relative ranking of skater s with respect to skater t, then the
final ranking of skater s should remain at least as good as the one of skater t if it was so before the
change. A judge may maintain or improve such a relative ranking by increasing the mark of skater s or
13diminishing the one of skater t, as with (BPM). However, he might also do so while increasing or
diminishing both skaters’ marks, which is permitted by (M).
(BI) says that only the relative rankings of two skaters should matter in establishing the final
relative ranking of these two skaters. (WP) says that if all judges are unanimous on the relative rankings
of two skaters, the final relative ranking of these two skaters should agree with the unanimous view of
the judges. Finally, (ND) prescribes that no judge be able to impose his or her ranking as the final ranking
in all circumstances.
Lemma 3: (M) Þ (BPM).
Proof. [˜ r
j
s £ r
j
s and ˜ r
j
t ³ r
j
t, " j Î N] Þ [r
j
s < r
j
t Þ ˜ r
j
s < ˜ r
j
t and r
j
s = r
j
t Þ ˜ r
j
s £ ˜ r
j
t, " j Î N] Þ
[FRs(R)<FRt(R) Þ FRs( ˜ R)<FRt( ˜ R) and FRs(R)=FRt(R) Þ FRs( ˜ R) £ FRt( ˜ R)].
That (M) is stronger than (BPM), i.e. that the inverse implication does not hold follows from the proof
of Theorem 4.
Theorem 4: The ISU ranking rule satisfies (ND), (WP), (RMP) and (BPM) but neither (M) nor (BI).
Proof. That the ISU Rule satisfies (ND), (WP), (RMP) and (BPM) can be checked readily from the
definitions. It is not difficult to find instances of violations of (M) and (BI). In Example 2, if judge 2 were
to change the ranks given to A, B, and C for respectively 4, 3, and 2, then their final rank would become
respectively 2, 3, and 1. Thus B, who was originally ranked before A, would move after this competitor
despite the fact that her relative position with respect to A has not changed in any of the judges’ opinion.
This is a violation of (M) and (BI). In the ISU Example, if judge 9 were to interchange his ranking of B
and E, this would not change his ranking of C relative to B. Yet, C would move ahead of B in the final
ranking. This is another violation of (M) and (BI).
There is a famous impossibility theorem in the theory of social choice due to Arrow (1951), which
says that there is no ranking rule that satisfies (BI), (ND), (WP) and (M). This theorem has been
reinforced in many ways by weakening some of the conditions imposed on the ranking rule. As put by
Kelly (1978, p.3), for each of Arrow’s conditions, there is now an impossibility theorem not employing
14that condition. One of them, due to Muller and Satterthwaite (1977), asserts that there is no ranking rule
that satisfies (ND), (WP) and (M). Since the ISU Rule satisfies (ND) and (WP), we could not expect (M)
to hold. This explains the use of the weaker condition (BPM) by BP. Since (M) and (BI) have much in
common, the violation of (BI) also comes as no surprise.
4. Which majority principle ?
Paragraphs 1, 2, and 6 of rule 371, which translate into (MRP), clearly reflect a majority principle.
The notion of median rank itself is based on a majority condition. Moreover, Theorem 1 states a clear
relationship between (MRP) and (RMP), a majority principle. However, (RMP) and thus (MRP) conflict
with the following well known criterion:
Condorcet Criterion (CC)
" s Î X, " t Î X, t ¹ s, sMt Þ FRs(R)=1a n dFRt(R)>1
In plain words, if a competitor is ranked ahead of all other competitors by an absolute majority
of judges, he or she should be ranked first. An s satisfying (CC) may not exist because of a cycle in the
majority relation M. This is the case in Example 3 of Table 3. There is a cycle of M over the whole set
X. When there exists an s Î X satisfying (CC), this s is called the Condorcet winner. Note that there may
exist a Condorcet winner even if there are cycles over some subsets of competitors. There is an instance
of this in the ISU Example. That (MRP) and (RMP) are completely at odds with (CC) may be seen from
Example 2. Competitor A obtains the first rank according to (CC) but is ranked after B according to
(MRP).
Condorcet was preoccupied not only with the winner but also with the whole ranking of the
alternatives, i.e. the competitors in our context. This may pose a problem since the majority relation may
contain cycles. Yet, a partial extension of (CC) to other ranks can be done as follows: If a competitor is
consistently ranked ahead of another competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he should be ahead
in the final ranking. The term "consistently" refers to the absence of cycles involving these two
competitors. Formally, let Ã0(X) be the class of partitions X ={ X1, ..., Xp}o fX, satisfying:
" Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, " s Î Xa, " t Î Xb : sMt
15Notice that, if there is a cycle of M over some subset of alternatives, then these alternatives must belong
to a same subset Xa of any partition in Ã0(X). In particular, this must be the case for two alternatives s
and t such that sT t. In the finest partition of this class, the sets Xa are cycles of maximal length of M or
singletons. X1 is also called the top cycle of M or the Condorcet set, a solution concept introduced by Good
(1971) and Schwartz (1972) for the strict majority relation. X2 is the top cycle on X\X 1, etc.
Extended Condorcet Criterion (XCC)
For any partition X Î Ã0(X), the following must hold:
" Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, " s Î Xa, " t Î Xb : FRs(R)<FRt(R)
It will be shown below that a maximum likelihood or a Kemeny order satisfies (XCC). Recall that it was
precisely Condorcet’s objective to show that the majority principle leads to a maximum likelihood order.
Hence, this justifies calling the above principle an Extended Condorcet Criterion.
If M = M and if M contains no cycles, then all Xa of the finest partition of Ã0(X) are singletons
and a final ranking FR(R) satisfying (XCC) is a complete order. When M contains a cycle, (XCC) does
not say how to rank alternatives within an Xa of the finest partition in Ã0(X). In particular, it does not
imply that FRs =F R t if sTt. In other words, (XCC) yields only a partial order in these circumstances. We
shall see in section 6 how a complete final ranking can be obtained with the maximum likelihood
approach.
In the different examples of this paper the (possibly partial) final ranking obtained from the
extended Condorcet criterion is headed by XCC. Competitors who belong to a same Xa and who cannot
be ranked by (XCC), because they belong to a same set of the finest possible partition of X, are simply
marked by a "?". This is the case with the set {I, M, L, K} in the ISU Example and with the whole set
X in Example 3. There is a cycle I M M M L M K M I over the set {I, M, L, K} in the ISU Example and
a cycle of M over the whole set X in Example 3.
165. Condorcet versus Borda versus ISU
Since (XCC) implies (CC), the conflict between (CC) and (MRP) of Example 2 is also a conflict
between (XCC) and (MRP). There is another violation of (XCC) by the ISU Rule in the ISU Example:
Competitor J should be ranked ahead of I according to (XCC) but the ISU Rule ranks them in the reverse
order.
(XCC) and (BC) may also conflict as can be seen from Example 2. This possibility of conflict has
been known since the lifetime of Borda and Condorcet, who debated passionately over the respective
merits of their rules. Nonetheless, it is well known that a Borda winner (loser) can never be a Condorcet
loser (winner).
Finally, the ISU Rule may violate (BC) despite the fact that principle d) is based on this criterion.
There are instances of such conflicts in all three examples. Worse, a Borda winner can be a loser
according to the ISU Rule. In Example 3, if the rankings of judges 4, 5, and 6 were changed for
respectively (6, 3, 4, 1, 5, 2), (6, 3, 4, 2, 5, 1), and (6, 3, 4, 2, 5, 1), then none of the criteria rs and nrs
would be modified and thus the ISU final ranking would remain the same. Yet E, who comes last in the
ISU final ranking, would become the Borda winner. The reason for these conflicts is precisely that (BC)
is called to the rescue only when the other three principles fail in ranking two competitors.
It would be interesting to know why the ISU seems reluctant to use exclusively the Borda criterion
to aggregate the rankings of the judges. Surprisingly, it does not hesitate to use a similar criterion to
aggregate the rankings FR
S obtained for the short program, FR
I for interpretive program and FR
F for free
skating into a single ranking. Indeed, the final ranking is established according to a weighted sum of the
ranks in the different FR. For example, if the three programs just mentioned are present in a competition,
the final ranks are determined according to the values of the components of the vector
.3FR
S +. 2 FR
I +. 5 FR
F. This is equivalent to supposing that there are 3 judges with the ranking FR
S,2
with FR
I, and 5 with FR
F, and using the Borda Criterion to aggregate them. More will be said on this
criterion in the final section.
176. The quest for a true ranking
An interesting question that arises in relation to the judging systems such as the one that prevails
in figure skating is whether a profile R represents the preferences of the judges on the set X or an
evaluation of the relative merits of the competitors according to given criteria. The regulations book of
the ISU is very clear in this respect. The judges do not furnish a ranking per se but scores for the different
elements of the competition. They are instructed on how to subtract points for different types of mistakes.
The intent of the rules is clearly to have judges furnish an evaluation of the relative merits of the
competitors in terms of scores. The different scores attributed to the different elements of the competition
are then aggregated and the ranking r
j of each judge is determined from these aggregated scores.
Assuming that the rankings r
j in some profile R are independent evaluations of the true ranking
of the competitors according to the established rules, an interesting question is: which final ranking FR(R)
is most likely to be the true ranking of the competitors? This is precisely the question addressed by
Condorcet (1785). His objective was to justify the majority principle. On this, he was certainly inspired
by Rousseau (1762) in his Social Contract, for whom the opinion of the majority is legitimate because
it expresses the "general will."
When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked is not exactly
whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in conformity with the
general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his vote, states his opinion on that
point; and the general will is found by counting votes. When therefore the opinion that
is contrary to my own prevails, this proves neither more nor less that I was mistaken, and
that what I thought to be the general will was not so. [Rousseau (1913), p. 93]
Condorcet’s objective was to formulate this proposition rigorously, using the calculus of
probability, which was new at that time. There is a best alternative, a second best, etc. Voters may have
different opinions because they are imperfect judges. However, if they are right more often than they are
wrong, then the opinion of the majority should yield the true order of the alternatives.
18Condorcet’s approach is one of the first applications of statistical hypothesis testing and maximum
likelihood estimation. He assumes that every voter chooses the best of two alternatives with a probability
p satisfying 1/2 < p £ 1, and that this judgment is independent between pairs and voters. If the binary
relation M is an order on X, then it is the solution to his problem, i.e. the most probable order on X.I fM
contains a cycle, Condorcet’s prescription is to eliminate some of the propositions (sMt is a proposition),
starting with the one with the weakest majority and so on until the cycle disappears. This works fine if
m = 3 but may give ambiguous results or a partial order for m ³ 4.
Young (1988) develops a correct application of Condorcet’s maximum likelihood approach. In the
case m = 3, it goes as follows. If the true order on the set {a, b, c}i sabc, then, neglecting a multiplicative
constant and the argument R in nst(R), the conditional probability of observing a profile of votes R is given
by:
pnab(1 p)nbapnac(1 p)ncapnbc(1 p)ncb pnab nac nbc(1 p)nba nca ncb
The probability of observing the same profile, conditional on the true order being acb, is given by:
pnac(1 p)ncapnab(1 p)nbapncb(1 p)nbc pnac nab ncb(1 p)nca nba nbc
Hence if p >½ ,abc is more probable than acb as on order if and only if nab+nac+nbc > nac+nab+ncb.
More generally, let:
K(r, R)
sÎX tÎX
rs<rt
nst(R).
An order r* on X is a solution of Condorcet’s problem or a maximum likelihood order if it is a solution
of maxr ÎÂK(r, R). The value of K(r, R) may be seen as the total number of pairwise supports for r in
profile R, i.e. the total number of voters who rank pairs of alternatives as in r. A maximum likelihood
order is thus one that has the maximum total support from the judges as expressed in R.
This problem may be given a different expression using a notion of distance for orders proposed
by Kemeny (1959). It is presented here in a slightly modified form to accommodate the fact that weak
orders may be found in profiles of rankings. Given an order r, a weak order r
j ÎÂ , and two competitors
s, t Î X, define:
19dst(r, r
j)
ì
ï
í
ï
î
1i f rs < rt and r
j
t £ r
j
s
0 otherwise
and D(r, r
j)=ås Î Xåt Î Xdst(r, r
j)
The value of dst(r, r
j) indicates whether there is a disagreement in the relative ranking of s and t between
r and r
j. D(r, r
j) is the total number of such disagreements between r and r
j. The function D is a distance
on the set Â, with the restriction that its first argument must be an order. One can then define a "distance"
d between an order r and a profile R by: d(r, R)=å
n
j=1D(r, r
j). In plain words, d(r, R) is the total number
of disagreements between an order r and all the rankings in profile R.
A Kemeny order for a profile R is an order r
K solving min r ÎÂd(r, R), i.e. an order that is closest
to the given profile according to the "distance" d or an order that has the minimum number of
disagreements with the profile. A Kemeny order is also a median order for the rankings in the profile. As
such, it represents the best compromise between the different opinions of the judges or voters.
The following lemmas and corollaries give some of the properties of this order. The first one asserts that
a Kemeny order is a maximum likelihood order. From this lemma, we can reassert that a maximum
likelihood order is one that has the maximum number of agreements with the profile.
Lemma 5: A Kemeny order for a profile R is an order solving maxr ÎÂK(r, R).
Proof. d(r, R)
sÎX tÎX
n
j 1
dst(r, r
j)
sÎX tÎX
rs<rt
(n nst(R)) m(m 1)n
2 sÎX tÎX
rs<rt
nst(R),
hence the result.
Lemma 6: Suppose r
K = (1, 2, ..., m) is a Kemeny order for a given profile R. Then ns, s+1(R) ³n s+1, s(R),
s = 1, ..., m − 1, or, equivalently, 1M 2M...M m.
Proof.Foranys = 1, ..., m − 1,considertheorderr = (1, 2, ..., s −1 ,s +1 ,s, s + 2, ..., m).Bytheproof
of Lemma 5, d(r
K,R )−d(r, R)=ns, s+1 − ns+1, s, which cannot be negative if r is a Kemeny order.
20Corollary 7: Given a Kemeny order for a given profile R, if there exists a Condorcet winner under this
profile, it must be the competitor ranked first in the Kemeny order.
Proof. Let r
K = (1, 2, ..., m) be a Kemeny order. From Lemma 6, ns−1, s(R) ³n s, s−1(R), s = 2, ..., m. Thus
none of the alternatives s = 2, ..., m may be a Condorcet winner, leaving 1 as the Condorcet winner.
Corollary 8: A Kemeny order r
K satisfies (XCC).
Proof. Suppose r
K violates (XCC), i.e. there exists a partition X Î Ã0(X), Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, s Î Xa
and t Î Xb such that r
K
t £ r
K
s. By definition of Ã0(X), we must have sMt. Thus, by Lemma 6, there must
exist other skaters, say a, ..., k, between t and s in the Kemeny order. Using Lemma 6 again, we must
have tMaM...MkMs. Since we also have sMt, there is a cycle over the set {t,a, ..., b,s}. Using the
definition of Ã0(X) again, {t,a, ..., b,s} should belong to the same set of the partition X. We thus have
a contradiction since, at the outset, s and t belonged to different Xa and Xb.
The next result provides an easy way to find complete Kemeny orders. In essence, it says that the
latter can be constructed by the concatenation of Kemeny orders on each of the sets of a partition
X Î Ã0(X). Recall that an order can take the form x or r, where xi is the competitor whose rank is i while
rs is the rank of competitor s.
Theorem 9: Take any partition X ={ X1, ..., Xp} Î Ã0(X) and an order x* = ˜ x1...˜ xp where ˜ xa is a Kemeny
order on Xa under profile R restricted to Xa, a = 1, ..., p. Then x* or equivalently the corresponding r*
is a Kemeny order on X.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an order r on X such that K(r, R)>K(r*, R). Then r cannot be different
from r* in respect only to competitors who belong to the same Xa since this would violate the assumption
that xa is a Kemeny order on Xa. Thus there exist Xa, Xb Î X with a < b, s Î Xa and t Î Xb such that
rt £ rs instead of rs < rt as in r*. By Corollary 8, r cannot be a Kemeny order since it violates (XCC). If
there were orders r such that K(r, R)>K(r*, R), there would be a Kemeny order among them. Thus there
is no such order and r* is a Kemeny order.
21If M ¹ M, we can go one step further in partitioning X. The details and an algorithm based on such
a partition can be found in Truchon (1998). For the time being, let us stay with the class Ã0(X). The
finest partition of Ã0(X) for the ISU Example is:
{{A}, {B}, {C}, {D}, {E}, {F}, {G}, {H}, {J}, {K, I, M, L}, {N}, {O}}.
The subset {I, K, L, M} cannot be broken because of a cycle on this subset. There are 4!, i.e. 24, possible
orders over this subset. However, using Lemma 6, one can eliminate all orders involving the terms LI, IK,
KL, LM, MI, and MK. This leaves the five orders given in the table below together with their values
K(r, RIKLM) where RIKLM is the restriction of R to the set {I, K, L, M}.
Order r K(r, RIKLM)
KIML
IMLK
ILKM
LKIM
MLKI
30
29
29
27
26
Hence the unique Kemeny order over the set {I, K, L, M} is KIML. Thus, according to Theorem 9, the
complete and unique Kemeny order over all competitors is ABCDEFGHJKIMLNO. The corresponding
r appears in the last column of Table 1. Within this order, we have JKIML. This is quite different from
IJKLM( K TL) given by the ISU Rule. The Borda rule gives: JIMKL.
Example 3 is a more striking illustration of the conflict that could exist between the ISU and the
Kemeny rules. There is a cycle over the whole set of competitors: E M A M B M C M D M F M E. The
Kemeny rule gives EABCDF as the unique final order while the ISU Rule gives ABDCFE. E is the
Kemeny winner but the worst competitor according to the ISU Rule.
22A Kemeny order is not necessarily unique. The following rule can be applied to handle the
occurrence of multiple Kemeny orders. Given a set {r
1, ..., r
k} of Kemeny orders, consider the weak order
r
m defined by:
" s,t Î X : r
m
s £ r
m
t Ûå
k
q=1r
q
s £å
k
q=1r
q
t
This weak order is a ranking according to the mean ranks of alternatives over all Kemeny orders. It will
be called the mean Kemeny ranking if it weakly agrees with at least one order in {r
1, ..., r
k}, i.e. if there
exists an order r
q Î {r
1, ..., r
k} such that:
" s,t Î X : r
q
s < r
q
t Þ r
m
s £ r
m
t
If r
m
s < r
m
t, this means that there are more Kemeny orders in which s is ranked ahead of t than
Kemeny orders in which s is placed after t. Thus, if a Kemeny order is chosen at random, the probability
that s be ranked ahead of t is higher than the probability that it be ranked after t.I nr
m, alternatives are
thus ranked according to these probabilities. In particular, two alternatives obtain the same rank if r
m
s = r
m
t.
Thus, choosing r
m over other Kemeny orders makes sense if r
m weakly agrees with one Kemeny order.
However, it would be inconsistent with the Kemeny-Young approach to choose r
m if it is not a Kemeny
order, since it is then less probable than any Kemeny order. In this case, a Kemeny order could be chosen
at random or according to some other criterion.
With this approach, we look for Kemeny orders but we may end up with a weak order as a final
choice. An alternative approach would consist in working with the set of weak orders instead of orders
at the outset but this would be costly. For example, there are 75 weak orders on a set of four alternatives
compared to 24 orders. The above approach is thus more practical.
One case in which r
m gives the same rank to two alternatives s and t is when nst = nts and when
in addition s and t are adjacent in any Kemeny order. Indeed, in this case, for any Kemeny order in which
s is ahead of t, there is another one in which the only difference is that the positions of s and t are
interchanged. In particular, all competitors of a cycle in T will be declared ex aequo under r
m.
23There are other instances in which some competitors could be declared ex aequo. In Example 3,
if judge 3 were to interchange her ranking of C and F, there would then be three Kemeny orders:
EABFCD, EABDFC, and EABCDF. This means that CDF, DFC and FCD have the same likelihood. Not
surprisingly, with this change, there is a cycle C M D M F M C over the set {C, D, F}. There is good
ground here to declare these three competitors ex aequo since they have the same likelihood of being in
any of the last three positions and this is what happens with r
m.
The modification of Example 3 introduced in Section 5, by changing the rankings of judges 4, 5,
and 6 for respectively (6, 3, 4, 1, 5, 2), (6, 3, 4, 2, 5, 1), and (6, 3, 4, 2, 5, 1), provides another example
of multiple Kemeny orders. There are six Kemeny orders: EADFBC, EADBCF, EABCDF, DFEABC,
DEAFBC, DEABCF. Here, there is no mean Kemeny order since r
m does not agree weakly with any of
the Kemeny orders.
Interestingly, in this case, the Borda criterion would rank the competitors in the following way:
(4, 2, 6, 2, 1, 4). Thus B and D would tie for the second rank and A and F would tie for the fourth rank.
Moreover, only one point in the Borda scores separates adjacent ranks, thus confirming the close
competition between all skaters. Recall that the ISU ranking in this case is (1, 2, 4, 3, 6, 5), completely
at odds with the Borda and the six Kemeny orders.
7. Other properties of the Kemeny Rule
As expected, the Kemeny rule does not satisfy (BI) and (M). In Example 3, if A and B had not
shown up for the competition or equivalently if all the judges had ranked them in the last two places
without changing the marks of all other competitors, then the unique Kemeny and Condorcet order would
become CDFE. Hence E would become the Condorcet loser, in violation of both (BI) and (M).
However, Young and Levenglick (1978) show that the Kemeny rule satisfies a weaker
independence condition that they call local independence of irrelevant alternatives (LIIA). Its definition
involves the concept of interval for orders. An interval for an order is any subset of alternatives that
occurs in succession in that order. For example, abcd, bcd, bc, cd, cde are intervals of the order abcde.
(LIIA) requires that the ranking of alternatives within any interval be unaffected by the presence of
24alternatives outside this interval. This condition implies that the ranking of alternatives toward the top of
the list is unaffected by the removal of those at the bottom, etc.
The Kemeny rule is also symmetric (it puts all judges on an equal footing), neutral (it treats all
skaters in the same way). Moreover, it satisfies (WP) and reinforcement (whenever two distinct groups
of judges both reach the same ranking of the skaters, this ranking is also the consensus for the two groups
of judges merged together). The Borda rule and more general positional methods to be defined in Section
9 also satisfy these properties but the Kemeny rule is the only one to satisfy (LIIA) as well. In Example
3, if B was dropped from the list, then C would take the first place from A in the Borda ranking. In
Example 2, we have an illustration of the violation of (LIIA) by the ISU Rule. Dropping D from the list
causes A to move ahead of B in the ISU ranking.
The ISU Rule may come far from giving the most probable ranking because of its extreme
sensitivity to the data. In Example 3, the ISU Rule gives E the last rank because 4 judges out of 7 gave
E rank 5. Yet it gives A the first rank while 3 judges gave this competitor rank 6. It appears that the ISU
Rule may be very sensitive to small perturbations and thus to errors in the judges’ rankings or attempts
at manipulation. For instance, in Example 3, suppose that judge 7 made a mistake and gave a ranking of
1 to A and 5 to E instead of the other way around. The effect of this error on the final ranking is
dramatic. It gives A the first rank and E the last rank, just the reverse of what would have happened
without this error. If one adheres to the point of view that judges try to evaluate all competitors as
objectively as possible but may err in doing so, this sort of sensitivity should be avoided.
This extreme sensitivity of the ISU Rule to the data is due to an incomplete use of available
information by (MRP). For example, a skater has the same median rank 3 whether he obtains ranks
(3, 3, 3, 3, 6, 6, 6) or (1, 1, 1, 3, 3, 3, 3) from a panel of seven judges. If he is alone with this median
rank, he will be ranked according to this median rank and will possibly obtain the same final rank with
any of the two profiles. In these circumstances, a change in the rank given by the middle judge in any of
the two rankings could have a big impact on the median rank of this skater and hence on his final ranking.
258. Comparison of Four Ranking Rules in 24 Olympic Competitions
The ISU, the Borda, the Kemeny rules have been applied to the data of the 24 olympic
competitions: men, women, and couples, short and free programs, for 1976, 1988, 1992 and 1994. The
rankings of the judges were constructed from the raw marks and the three rules were then used to
aggregate these individual rankings into a final ranking. Summing the raw marks of all the judges provided
a fourth ranking. The Kemeny orders were found with the algorithm described in Truchon (1998). In the
case of multiple Kemeny orders, the mean Kemeny order r
m was chosen when it existed. Otherwise, the
Kemeny order closest to the ISU ranking was retained so as to minimize the disagreement between the
two.
The result of applying the four ranking rules to these competitions is summarized in Table 4 with
a measure of the disagreement between the rankings. This measure is essentially the Kemeny measure with
the difference that a tie between two competitors in a ranking instead of a strict relation in the other is
counted as half a complete reversal. More precisely, given two rankings, i.e. two weak orders r and
r* ÎÂand two competitors s, t Î X, define:
gst(r, r )
ì
ï
ï
ï
ï
í
ï
ï
ï
ï
î
1 if rs < rt and rt < rs
1
2
if rs rt and rt < rs
1
2
if rs < rt and rt rs
0 otherwise
The measure of the disagreement between r and r* is defined by: G(r, r*)=ås Î Xåt Î Xgst(r, r*)
The last column of Table 4 complements this measure by giving some details on the presence of
cycles and on the disagreements between the Kemeny and the ISU orders. A k-cycle is a cycle over k
competitors. All ties that are mentioned in these remarks are those found in the mean Kemeny rankings.
These results have been summarized in the Introduction. More can also be found in the Conclusion. Note
that all the computations needed for each pair of competitions (short, free) or each row of Table 4 have
taken less than 8 seconds on a Pentium 200 running Mathematica and a procedure written by the author.
26Finally Table 5 gives the details of the women short competition of the 1988 Olympic Games. The
names have been changed for A, B, C, ... The majority relation contains a cycle over the subset {O, P,
Q, R, S, T}. The unique Kememy order over this subset is quite different from the other three orders. But
there are differences involving other skaters as well, for instance skater L.
9. On the Manipulability
BP contend that "Median ranks provide strong safeguard against manipulation by a minority of
judges." Manipulation means misrepresentation of one’s true ranking by a judge in order to change the
final ranking for one that he or she prefers. A judge might be interested only in the winner of a
competition and could thus try to manipulate the ranking procedure with this objective in mind. We could
then see the ranking procedure as a social choice function, i.e. a function that selects a winner.
There is another famous impossibility theorem in this context, due to Gibbard (1973) and
Satthertwaite (1975), which says that all non-dictatorial (ND) social choice functions are manipulable.
Muller and Satthertwaite (1977) also establish that a social choice function is not manipulable if and only
if it satisfies (M), a condition violated by the ISU, the Borda and the Kemeny rules. There is a strong link
between these impossibility results and the one of Arrow.
A judge may prefer a ranking to another one, not just because of the winner, but because of the
whole ranking. One way to formalize this preference would be to use the Kemeny distance between two
rankings defined in Section 6 to represent the preference of a judge over the set of all possible rankings.
Bossert and Storcken (1992) extend the Gibbard-Satthertwaite theorem to this context. The ISU Rule does
not escape these theorems.
For instance, in the ISU Example, judge 9 could improve the final ranking of his most favourite
competitor C by simply interchanging his ranking of B and E, without changing anything else in the final
ranking. In this case, the possibility of manipulation rests upon the use of the (BC) criterion or principle
d). However, (MRP) or principle a) lends itself to manipulation. In Example 2, if judge 5 were to
interchange his ranking of A and C, he would make A move ahead of B in the final ranking, which would
agree with his own relative ranking of the two competitors.
27Some ranking rules may be more prone to manipulation than others. For instance, the Borda rule
has been considered as highly manipulable for a long time, mainly because it violates (BI). Many authors
have constructed examples showing that a coordinated action by many voters may have a dramatic impact
on the final Borda ranking. Already in the 19
th Century, the French mathematician Laplace (1812) pointed
out that even honest voters could be tempted to give the last ranks to the strongest candidates in order to
favour their own candidate. This, in his opinion, would give a great advantage to mediocre candidates.
He added that, for this reason, this rule had been abandoned by institutions that had previously adopted
it. Borda’s answer is well known: My method should be used only with honest people.
The last word on this question, for the present time at least, is probably due to Saari (1990). He
shows that, at least for m = 3, it is the Borda rule that maximizes the expected strategic impact of
manipulation. However, the impact of manipulation is just one aspect of the question. To have any impact,
manipulation must be successful. The second question is thus opportunity. How often can a judge be
successful at manipulating the final ranking? An analysis of manipulation requires combining both the
impact of manipulation and an accounting of how often manipulation can succeed.
Saari develops a measure of susceptibility to manipulation for positional voting procedures. A
positional voting procedure is one in which m specified weights w1, ..., wm, with ws ³ ws+1, w1 > wm =0 ,
are used to tally the ballots. The competitors are then ranked according to the total number of points that
they receive. For example, (1, 0, ..., 0) corresponds to the plurality vote and (m −1 ,m − 2, ..., 1, 0) to
the Borda method.
His study is done under the following assumptions. It is equally likely for any pair of alternatives
to be the target of a manipulation attempt; all profiles of rankings are equally likely; and it is equally
likely that a strategic voter or a small coalition of strategic voters has any particular ranking.
His most surprising finding is that, among all positional voting procedures, the Borda rule is the
method that either minimizes, or comes close to minimizing, the likelihood of a successful manipulation
by a small group of individuals. This result is essentially due to the fixed value for the successive
differences between the weights wi used in the Borda method. However, this same property makes this
rule vulnerable to carefully coordinated manipulation by large groups. The worst procedures, i.e. the ones
28most susceptible of being manipulated by a small coalition, are the plurality (1, 0, ..., 0) and the anti-
plurality (1, 1, ..., 1, 0) rules.
What can be said of the ISU Rule in this respect? It can be shown that the ISU Rule is the
combination of many positional procedures. Indeed, we can write the ISU Rule as a (m − 1) iteration
procedure: At iteration i<m− 1, rank all competitors who have not been ranked in previous iterations
according to nis(R) and retain those for whom nis(R)>n/2. If there are ties between some of the
competitors who have just been ranked, try to break the ties using the Brs(R) first and the Bs(R) if there
still remain ties. If some of the competitors have not been ranked after this iteration, then go to the next
one, i.e. increase i by one. If iteration m − 1 is reached, retain the ranking given by nis(R). Note that there
can be only one competitor with rank m and that no tie breaking rule is necessary to find him or her.
This iterative process can be seen as an election with runoffs. At the first iteration, the competitors
who get a majority for the first rank are given this rank. The remaining competitors are then ranked in
a new election and so on. Formally, at iteration i, the positional rule defined by (1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0), i.e. a
vector with the first i components equal to 1 and all others equal to 0, is actually used in the first step.
Each of these positional rules is an approval voting method: List your i most preferred competitors and
each of them will get one point in the counting process. According to Saari’s findings, each of these
procedures is more susceptible to manipulation than the Borda rule. The procedures used in the first and
last iterations are respectively the plurality and the anti-plurality ones, the worst possible. The restricted
Borda and the Borda procedure itself, which are also two positional procedures, are used only to break
ties. The restricted Borda procedure is a special one in that not all votes are counted.
The ISU Rule is a combination of many procedures that are susceptible to manipulation. Is the
ISU Rule more or less susceptible to manipulation than any of its components? There is probably no clear
cut answer to this question. On the one hand, the fact that manipulation within a positional procedure may
imply the recourse to a different one may reduce the opportunities for manipulation within the first
procedure. On the other hand, this same fact may open additional possibilities to the manipulators.
Whether these additional possibilities will compensate for the lost ones is an open question to me. The
answer probably depends on the circumstances. We would like to know what it gives on average.
29However, in as much as the Borda rule is rarely used in this context, it is safe to assert that the
performance of the whole ISU Rule cannot be as good as that of the Borda rule in terms of susceptibility
to manipulation.
The Kemeny rule does not escape the Gibbard-Satthertwaite and the Bossert-Storcken theorems
either. Whether it is more or less susceptible to manipulation than the ISU Rule or any positional rule
seems to remain an open question. However, the fact that it satisfies the local independence condition
certainly limits the possibilities of its manipulation. Moreover, the fact that it involves complex
computations certainly does not make it easy to manipulate. Susceptibility to manipulation and ease of
manipulation are two different things.
Under (XCC) and the Kemeny rule, if a subset of judges is unable to arrive at a cycle in the
majority relation whatever their way of ranking the competitors, then they are unable to manipulate the
final ranking since the latter will be given by the majority relation alone. Under these circumstances, the
best way for these judges to make sure that the final ranking resembles their own ranking is to report the
latter.
If a subset of judges can produce a cycle by strategically ranking the competitors, thus forcing the
use of the Kemeny rule per se, then this strategic behaviour, to be successful, must at the same time
produce a Kemeny order preferable to the final ranking that would be obtained otherwise. This may be
impossible or would require a lot of sophistication from these judges. Their task would be easier if there
was a cycle in the majority relation before any attempt at manipulation. However, they would have to be
aware of the presence of this cycle before hand.
Of course, this begs the question of the possible lack of objectivity by the judges. In their
empirical study of the results of the 24 olympic competitions analyzed in this paper, Campbell and
Galbraith (1996) find strong evidence of the presence of a small national bias, the latter being more
marked for medal contenders than for less strong competitors.
3010. Conclusion
This paper shows that the occurrence of cycles in the majority relation is not only a theoretical
possibility. It also shows that the choice of a rule is not merely an academic question. Aside from the
sensitivity to manipulation, it can have a real impact on the results. Many disagreements have been found
between the ISU, the Borda, the Kemeny rankings and the one according to raw marks in 24 olympic
competitions. Many of the differences occurred for middle places but in many instances, the Kemeny rule
gave a tie for the first, second and third ranks instead of a strict order.
The choice of a particular ranking rule should be based on its properties. While the ISU puts
forward a majority principle as the basis of its ranking rule, this principle is at odds with the usual
Condorcet criterion, which says that if a competitor is ranked ahead of all other competitors by an absolute
majority of judges, he should be first in the final ranking. The ISU rule also conflicts with an extension
of this principle to other ranks, which goes as follows: If a competitor is ranked consistently ahead of
another competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he or she should be ahead in the final ranking.
Consistency refers to the absence of cycle involving these two skaters.
The Extended Condorcet Criterion defined in this paper may give a complete ranking of all
competitors in ideal circumstances. In the case of cycles, an additional criterion is however needed to
break cycles while retaining Condorcet’s objective in mind, which was to find a ranking with the highest
probability of being the true ranking. The Kemeny rule fulfils this objective if the judges are able to
choose the better of two competitors with a probability larger than one half. It thus seems especially
appropriate when the decision is being taken by a group of experts as is the case in skating.
Young (1995) advocates this rule for social decision purposes. Le Breton and Truchon (1997)
propose a measure of how far from the Borda rule a social choice function may be. They find that the
Kemeny rule fares best, as compared to other rules satisfying the Condorcet criterion. It does almost as
well as the Condorcet rule. This paper shows that, for most practical applications, Kemeny orders can be
found easily with a laptop computer.
Another alternative to the ISU Rule would be to use the Borda rule from the beginning of the
process through the obtention of the global ranking. This rule seems to be used in many local
31competitions. The Borda rule has much to command for itself. It is a positional rule, which satisfies
interesting requirements such as another reinforcement condition (different from the one defined in Section
7) and participation. The first one says that, if two distinct panels of judges select the same winner, then
the joint panel should also select this winner. Participation means that if an additional judge succeeds in
changing the winner, it can only be in the sense that he or she favours. There is no rule consistent with
the Condorcet criterion, such as the Kemeny rule, that satisfies these two requirements. The reader is
referred to Young (1974) or Moulin (1988) for more details on these rules. Based on the findings of Saari
(1990), the Borda rule also appears to be less susceptible to manipulation by a minority of judges than
the ISU Rule. Manipulation by a large coalition of judges is not really an issue in rating skating.
In their Monte Carlo experiment, BP contrast the ISU Rule with a method that consists in
summing the raw marks of the judges. They start with true marks for all competitors that result in a
complete ranking, their true ranking. The marks of each judge are then obtained by adding a random term
to the true marks, truncating the result at 6.0. With true marks ranging from 4.8 to 5.8, they find that the
ISU Rule outperforms the simple addition of the raw marks in picking the true winner (54% of the time
versus 46%). It would be interesting to see how the Kemeny and the Borda rules would have performed
in picking the true winner as compared to the ISU Rule. In the olympic data, the Kemeny rankings had,
on a whole, slightly less disagreements and the Borda rankings had significantly less disagreements with
the rankings according to the raw marks than the ISU rankings.
BP’s results raise an interesting theoretical question: Is there a good theoretical basis for throwing
away the raw marks of the judges and retaining only the relative rankings drawn from these marks? BP’s
simulations suggest that neglecting part of the information may play an important role in smoothing out
errors in the judges’ marks. We might also think of a role for this procedure in reducing the scope for
manipulation. However, both contentions would need a firmer theoretical justification.
32Table 1: The ISU Example
s Judges Criteria Final rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 rs nrs Brs Bs ISU BC XCC K
A 11111314416 1 71111
B332211233258 2 02222
C224332311258 2 13333
D6656475225 5 18 43 4444
E4464768555 5 22 49 5555
F4587544885 5 22 53 6666
G88399566665 6 07777
H77756977778 6 28888
I 11 10 12 12 10 11 12 11 11 11 6 100 91 0 ?11
J 1 291 3 1 18 81 391 211 5 45 95 10 9 9 9
K 10 12 11 10 13 10 14 10 15 11 5 51 105 11 12 ? 10
L 1 31 11 4 8 1 11 31 11 41 011 5 51 105 11 12 ? 13
M 9 13 9 14 15 14 9 12 9 12 5 104 13 11 ? 12
N 15 15 10 13 12 12 10 15 13 13 6 115 14 14 14 14
O 14 14 15 15 14 15 15 13 14 14 5 129 15 15 15 15Table 2: Example 2
s Judges Criteria Final rank
1 2 3 4 5 rs nrs Brs Bs ISU BC XCC K
A 1313335 1 12111
B2224423 1 41322
C3431134 1 23233
D4542244 1 74444
E5155555 21 5 5 5 5
Table 3: Example 3
s Judges Criteria Final rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 rs nrs Brs Bs ISU BC XCC K
A 222666124 2 513 ?2
B333111636 1 821 ?3
C444444247 2 644 ?4
D556332334 2 735 ?5
E111555557 2 362 ?1
F665223444 28 5 6 ? 6Table 4: Comparison of Four Ranking Rules in 24 Olympic Competitions
Competition Short Program Free Program Remarks
Men 1976
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 4.5 2.5 3.5
Marks 3. 2.
Borda 3.
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2. 0 0
Marks 2. 0
Borda 2.
A 6-cycle, tie for ranks 3-4,
inversions in 5-9 in short pr.
A 3-cycle, tie for 2-3 in free pr.
Men 1988
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2.5 3. 7.5
Marks 7. 4.5
Borda 2.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2. 3. 5.
Marks 4. 2.
Borda 3.
Three 3-cycles in short program.
Men 1992
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 0.5 1. 2.
Marks 2.5 1.
Borda 1.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 0 1.5 0.5
Marks 0.5 2.
Borda 1.5
A 3-cycle in short program.
A 5-cycle and a 3-cycle in free
program.
Men 1994
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2. 1.5 3.5
Marks 1.5 2.
Borda 1.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 1.5 3.5 5.5
Marks 4. 5.
Borda 3.
No cycle.  Tie for ranks 3-4 in
short program.
Women 1976
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2.5 1. 4.
Marks 4.5 3.
Borda 1.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 1. 3.5 3.5
Marks 2.5 2.
Borda 3.5
No cycle.  Inversion in ranks 3-4,
tie for ranks 5-6, 7-8, 9-10 in
short program.
Women 1988
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 8. 5. 8.
Marks 7. 3.
Borda 6.
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2. 2.5 3.
Marks 3. 3.5
Borda 3.5
A 9-cycle (ranks 12-20) in short
program. Inversions starting at
rank 12 in both programs.
Women 1992
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 7.5 7. 6.5
Marks 4. 3.5
Borda 5.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 1.5 4. 3.5
Marks 5. 1.5
Borda 4.5
Two 3-cycles, inversion in ranks
7-8, tie for 3-4 in short program.
A 3-cycle, tie for ranks 1-2, 4-5,
10-11 in free program.
Women 1994
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 4.5 3. 4.
Marks 6.5 3.
Borda 4.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2. 2. 5.5
Marks 5.5 3.5
Borda 2.
Two 3-cycles,  inversion for
ranks 9-10 in short  program.
Tie for ranks 1-2 in free program
Couples 1976
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 2. 1.5 3.
Marks 3. 3.5
Borda 3.5
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 1. 0 1.
Marks 2. 1.
Borda 1.
A 4-cycle (ranks 10-13) in short
program.
Couples 1988
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 0 1. 0.5
Marks 0.5 0.5
Borda 1.
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 0.5 0 2.
Marks 1.5 2.
Borda 0.5
No cycle. Tie for ranks 5-6 in
free program.
Couples 1992
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 0 1. 1.
Marks 1. 0
Borda 1.
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 1.5 1. 2.
Marks 0.5 1.
Borda 0.5
No cycle. Tie for ranks 3-4 in
free program.
Couples 1994
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 1. 2. 2.
Marks 1. 0
Borda 1.
Kemeny Borda Marks
ISU 0.5 1. 2.
Marks 1.5 1.
Borda 0.5
No cycle.
The numbers in the cells are measures of the disagreement between the rankings.Table 5: Comparison of Four Ranking Rules in the Women Short Program
of the 1988 Olympic Competition
Skater ISU Marks Borda Kemeny
A 11 1 1
B 22 2 2
C 33 3 3
D 44 4 4
E 55 5 5
F 66 6 6
G 78 7 7
H 87 7 8
I 99 9 9
J 10 10 10 10
K 11 11 11 11
L 12 14 14 14
M 13 12 12 12
N 14 13 13 13
O 15 16 15 18
P 16 18 17 15
Q 17 14 15 17
R 18 19 19 20
S 19 17 18 16
T 20 19 20 19
U 21 21 21 21
V 22 22 22 22
W 23 23 23 23Appendix
Rule 371 of the ISU
Determination of results of each part of a competition
1. The competitor
1 placed first by the absolute majority of Judges in a part of the competition is first; he
who is placed second or better by an absolute majority is second and so on.
2. For this purpose, the place numbers 1 and 2 count as second place; place numbers 1, 2 and 3 count as
third place, and so on.
3. If two or more competitors have obtained a majority for the same place, the first among them is he who
has been so placed by the greater number of Judges.
4. If such majorities are equal, then the lowest total of place numbers of those Judges forming the majority
determines between them.
5. If the total of the place number is equal according to paragraph 4, the sum of the place numbers of all
Judges determines the result; if this is also equal the competitors are tied.
6. If there is no absolute majority for a place, the result for such place must be ascertained by seeking the
best majority for the following place; and if there is no such majority then by seeking the best majority
for the next following place and so on.
7. If such majorities are equal under paragraph 6, the systems referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 must be
applied.
8. The ascertainment of each place must first be made in accordance with paragraphs 1 through 5, and
thereafter according to paragraphs 6 and 7 in the above mentioned order.
9. a) If two or more competitors are temporarily tied with majorities for the same place, the place must
be awarded to one of those competitors on the basis of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5. After awarding the place,
the remaining temporarily tied competitor(s) must be awarded the next following place(s) on the basis of
paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 without considering any additional competitors.
b) In awarding the subsequent places thereafter, the unplaced competitors with a majority for the lowest
numbered place shall be given first consideration.
10. If the foregoing rules fail to determine the award of any place, then the competitors tied for that place
must be announced as tied. If two competitors so tie for first place, the next place to be awarded is third
place (not second). If two skaters so tie for second place, the next place to be awarded is fourth place (not
third) and so on.
1 Rule 371 adds "or the team" after every instance of "competitor". It has been omitted.References
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